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Abstract
Lesbian and gay sociology has witnessed a reﬂexive turn in recent years, which emphasises choice, self-
creation and self-determination in the formation of sexual identities. Individuals are involved in, what
Giddens (1991) called, a 'project of self' or a 'reﬂexive biography', which allows them to engage in a
dynamic and constantly evolving process of deﬁning and re-deﬁning their self-identity. Identity becomes
ﬂuid, fragmented and plastic. In a recent issue of this journal, Brian Heaphy argued that such accounts of
lesbian and gay reﬂexivity are partial and fail to take account of the ways in which structural factors
continue to limit one's choice narrative and he proposed a move towards a reﬂexive sociology, rather than
a sociology of reﬂexivity. This article seeks to develop Heaphy's argument further and suggests that the
limitation of theories of reﬂexivity lies in their inability to adequately account for the continued signiﬁcance
of collectivity, interdependency and human relations in shaping an individual's identity. Drawing on Norbert
Elias' ﬁgurational sociology, it will be argued that against a reﬂexive model of identity that privileges
individualism, choice and creativity over collectivity and material constraints, there is a pressing need to
revisit and re-establish our interdependent relationships with one another.
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Introduction
1.1 In a recent issue of this journal, Brian Heaphy (2008) problematised the reﬂexive turn in lesbian and
gay sociology. Since the early 1990s there has been a growing interest in and signiﬁcance attached to the
notion of reﬂexivity in the sociology of identity, including in lesbian and gay sociology. Derived from and
underpinned by the work of Anthony Giddens (1991; 1992; 1994), Ulrich Beck (1992; 1994) and Scott Lash
(1994) the “extended reﬂexivity thesis” (Adams, 2006: p.512) that dominates contemporary sociological
theories of identity formation emphasises the uncertainty and unpredictability of life in late / high / post
modernity. Gone are the traditional social structures and collectivities that shaped and constrained an
individual’s life experiences and expectancies and in their place are individual choice, self-creation and
self-determination.
1.2Heaphy claimed that not only does the focus on choice, creation and self-reﬂexivity fail to account for
the ways in which power dynamics and positionality in society continue to limit one’s biography, such
theories also underestimate the social, cultural and economic resources required for self-determination. By
failing to take account of the differential and unequal experiences of individuals writing their own narrative,
it might be argued that theories of self-reﬂexivity hold untenable generalisations and, in so doing, “validate,
valorise and make visible exclusive experience as lesbian and gay experience” (Heaphy 2008). Whilst in
support of Heaphy’s concerns over accounts of lesbian and gay reﬂexivity, this article seeks to develop his
arguments further. Heaphy claims that, as researchers, “we rarely explicitly explore the limits of our
analyses in terms of whose realities are represented, whose are made visible, and what interests of power
are promoted” (Heaphy, 2008). I would argue that this is due, in part, to the failure of theories of reﬂexivity
to adequately account for the continued signiﬁcance of collectivity and interdependency in shaping
individual identity and it is impossible to understand and make sense of individual identities outside of and
independent to collective identities.
1.3 Heaphy’s article rests on the argument that accounts of lesbian and gay reﬂexivity are partial,
reﬂecting, what has been called elsewhere, ‘partial life projects’ (Du Bois Raymond, 1998), which
“unreﬂectively afﬁrm exclusive and normative assumptions” (Heaphy, 2008) about lesbian and gay lives
and politics. He suggested that although rooted in liberatory and afﬁrmative agendas, the unintendedconsequences of such an approach are that the diversity of lesbian and gay experiences is marginalised
and, frequently, it is the experiences of the researcher rather than the research subjects that are
represented. Consequently, such accounts “often reﬂect white, urban, middle-class habitus” (Heaphy,
2008). To counter the tendency towards afﬁrmative and normative accounts of lesbian and gay life, Heaphy
proposes a move away from theories of reﬂexivity to methodological reﬂexivity or reﬂexive sociology. Here,
there is a recognition that all analyses of social life are fragmented and partial in the sense that research
can never present subjects’ lives in their entirety and there is an acknowledgement that it is impossible to
objectively analyse the social world because researchers are simultaneously analysts of and
interdependent actors in the social processes they seek to understand. They bring with them their own
experiences, assumptions and their own, largely unconscious, habitus.
1.4 This article will attempt to develop Heaphy’s arguments by drawing on Norbert Elias’ process
sociology. It will argue that individual and collective identity / habitus are inextricably linked and it is,
therefore, impossible to analyse individual subjectivities and life trajectories outside of the material
circumstances within which individuals ﬁnd themselves. It will begin by outlining the central tenets of Elias’
process sociology, which attempts to overcome dichotomous models of structure / agency and objectivism
/ subjectivism. In so doing, it avoids both the reifying tendencies of overly deterministic accounts of social
life and the excessively individual accounts that fail to address the continued signiﬁcance of material
circumstances in shaping an individual’s life experiences and expectations. It will then go on to consider
the manifestation of theories of reﬂexivity in lesbian and gay sociology. Heaphy (2008) suggests that there
is some similarity and compatibility between Giddens’ notion of the project of the self and the tradition
within lesbian and gay studies of documenting the lives, experiences and narratives of lesbian and gay
man as both emphasise creativity and reﬂexivity. However, I would posit that, despite the emphasis on
biography, story-telling and self-identity in contemporary lesbian and gay sociology, if read through an
Eliasian lens, they can be seen, not as theories based on a reﬂexivity that is isolated or individualised but
rather on a notion of reﬂexivity that tells us something about collective sexual identities and human
interdependencies. From this perspective, with its emphasis on relationality and human interdependencies,
choices made by one individual are not isolated, self-reﬂexive projects but, instead are interwoven with,
shaped by and, in turn, shape the choices made by others. Where theories of self-reﬂexivity focus on
dynamism, ﬂuidity and change, Elias’ process sociology stresses the continuities in social life and its
formation and reformation over time.
Norbert Elias’ Process Sociology
2.1 Norbert Elias’ process sociology can be seen as an attempt to move beyond dualities such as
structure / agency, individual / society and objectivism / subjectivism. As a result, he was critical of what
he saw as the tendency towards reiﬁcation in sociology, which presents social structures as objects
external to and over and above the individual. He argued that this was a “naively egocentric” (Elias, 1970:
p.14) view of social life, which, not only served to “dehumanize social structures” (ibid, p.16) but also gave
the false impression that individuals are separated from society by “some invisible barrier” (ibid, p.15). For
Elias, the things we call social structures are not external objects exerting pressure on individuals to act in
particular ways. They are the product of social relations and human interdependencies.
2.2 Elias was also equally critical of what he saw as excessive individualism and the tendency to present
society as the intentional outcome of individual action and individual agency. The social world is the
product, not of individual action or consciousness, but rather the result of social networks and collectivities
formed over several generations (Smith, 2001). Elias developed the idea of unplanned social processes or
unplanned order to explain how individuals exercise agency within the constraints of their material
circumstances arguing that there is little relationship between our planned and intentional actions and the
consequences of them. We do exercise agency but not in circumstances of our own making and, due to
the relational nature of social life and human interdependencies, a choice exercised by one individual
“becomes interwoven with those of others; it unleashes further chains of actions, the direction and
provisional outcome of which depend not on him [sic] but on the distribution of power and the structure of
tensions within this whole mobile human network” (Elias, 1991: p.49-50). Elias’ notion of unplanned order
not only highlights the ﬂuidity and indeterminacy of everyday practice, it also suggests that individuals are
both free to act in social interactions and, at the same time, are constrained by their social position. It is
with the concept of habitus that Elias most clearly articulates the interdependent relationship between the
individual, the collective and social structures.
2.3 Although Pierre Bourdieu is perhaps the most widely known social theorist to use the concept of
habitus and it is his characterisation of habitus that dominates contemporary sociological theories of
identity, Elias also used it[1]. In contemporary sociology[2], habitus tends to be understood as a habit, an
acquired disposition (Crossley, 2005: p.104) or a typical condition of the body (Jenkins, 2002). Habitus
exists at an unconscious level and can be understood as values, behaviours and dispositions that have
become so naturalised and taken for granted that they are literally embodied. There are two distinct ways in
which Elias’ conception of habitus might be understood as embodied. Firstly, habitus is something
experienced intrapsychically, as a psychic structure or personality type and, secondly, habitus has a
material reality in so far as it is produced and reproduced through our practices and interactions with
others.
2.4 Another important feature of the habitus is the distinction Elias makes between the individual,
subjective habitus as embodied in individuals and the social, collective habitus based on shared
experiences and social position. Whilst each individual’s habitus will be unique to them to understand
subjective habitus as not only individually experienced but also individually authored is to abstract
individual life trajectories from their material surrounding. Social habitus refers to the shared habits,
dispositions and practices of groups. For Elias, social habitus can be understood as “the soil from which
grow the personal characteristics through which an individual differs from other members of his society”
(Elias, 1991:p.182). In this sense, Elias uses the notion of social habitus to present a view of social lifethat allows for agency and choice but within circumstances not of individuals’ making. Individual habitus,
the habits, dispositions and practices “speciﬁc to a particular person” (Fletcher, 1997: p.11) can only ever
be understood as an aspect of the wider social habitus. So, although individual habitus has uniqueness to
it, it is always grounded in the collective or shared habitus. Of course, it is important to remember that
Elias adopted a processual view of social life and, therefore, habitus, individually experienced and
collectively authored, should be seen as a life long process, which begins at birth. Elias argued that it was
not possible to understand individual or social habitus without reference to their formation and reformation
over time. In the words of Elias, our “whole outlook on life continues to be psychologically tied to
yesterday’s social reality, although today’s and tomorrow’s reality already differs greatly from yesterday’s”
(Elias, 1986: p.35 cited in van Krieken, 1998: p.61).
2.5 So, whilst constructions of sexuality are socially, culturally and historically speciﬁc, the meanings
attached to constructions in one era do not supplant and replace those of earlier eras. Instead, vestiges of
previous constructions persist, underpinning and informing the emerging conceptualisations. Contemporary
constructions of sexuality and sexual identities, therefore, should be seen as products of long-term social
processes. In other words, there are continuities in the history of sexuality and contemporary identities,
both individual and collective, are rooted in the past as well as the present. So, for Elias, individual and
shared habitus tell us as much about social life and social processes of the past as they do about
contemporary social life. Indeed, due to the habitual and largely unconscious nature of the habitus, it is
relatively slow, perhaps even resistant to change and may therefore be more reﬂective of the habitus of the
past than it is of the habitus of the present. This warns us against accepting a reﬂexive model of identity
formation that privileges choice and self-creation and the expense of continuity and process, as sexual
identities cannot be written and re-written in isolation and cannot be separated from their historical roots.
Figurations and the formation of ‘I’ and ‘We’ Identities
3.1 For Elias, all human relations are relations of interdependency or, what he called, ﬁgurations. We only
become individuals and develop our self and group identity in and through our social relations, which in turn
sit within wider social networks of interdependencies (van Krieken, 1998; Smith, 2001). Elias (1970) drew
on everyday language and, particularly, the use of personal pronouns as a ﬁgurational model. The pronouns
‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, she’, ‘we’ and ‘they’ can be used to represent positions in society and articulate the
interconnectedness of social life, since each position can only be understood in the context of and with
reference to the other positions.
3.2 Elias saw personal pronoun positions as something separate and distinct from social positions or roles.
Social roles always refer to the same person, whilst personal pronouns can and do change. Therefore, the
personal pronoun model allows us to recognise our interdependencies, our relationships with those in our
intercommunicating groups, even though we may occupy different social positions or roles. However, these
social ﬁgurations are not ﬁxed or static. They are dynamic, in “a state of constant ﬂux and transformation,
with interweaving processes of change occurring over different but interlocking time-frames” (Quilley &
Loyal, 2004: p.5). Members of groups may “say ‘we’ of themselves and ‘they’ of other people; but they
may say ‘we’ and ‘they’ of different people as time goes by” (Elias, 1970: p.128).
3.3 Elias’ personal pronoun model, which locates individual identity within a wider web of interconnecting
and interdependent identities, provides a useful lens though which to examine contemporary lesbian and
gay life and represents a counter to the dominance of the theories of self-reﬂexivity. For Elias (1970), we
can only refer to ourselves as ‘I’ in relation to those people we call ‘We’ and ‘They’. So, whilst the
expression of a lesbian or gay identity does involve choice, creation and biography it should be seen as a
form of story-telling that is predicated on, or at the very least, shaped by, ﬁgurational relationships and the
changing dynamics of ‘I’, ‘We’ and ‘They’ pronouns.
3.4 Throughout history the membership of ‘We’ and ‘They’ groups in relation to the lesbian / gay ‘I’ has
changed, reﬂecting the ﬂuid and dynamic nature of these ﬁgurations. For example, under the conditions of
compulsory heterosexuality (Rich, 1983) ﬁgurations develop between those whose sexuality conforms to
the accepted parameters of heteronormativity and those individuals whose sexuality is outside and,
therefore, challenges heteronormativity. These ﬁgurations perpetuate relations of inclusion and exclusion
and are central in the creation and continuation of sexual communities as a focus of both individual and
collective identity. Here, not only is Elias’ personal pronoun model instructive but so too is his
conceptualisation of established and outsider relations. A relatively late development in his process
sociology, the concept of established and outsider relations emerged out of his research undertaken in
collaboration with John Scotson in the early 1960s. Although Elias and Scotson deﬁned community in
terms of human interdependencies within a shared geographical locale (van Krieken, 1998), their work on
the characteristics and maintenance of established and outsider relations has a much wider application.
Elias was essentially concerned with the means by which “members of groups which are, in terms of
power, stronger than other interdependent groups, think of themselves in human terms as better than the
others … [and] … What is more, in all these cases the “superior” people may make the less powerful
people themselves feel they lack virtue - that they are inferior in human terms” (Elias and Scotson, 1994:
p.xv-xvi, italics in original). In other words, established and outsider relations are characterised by the
normalisation of relations of dominance and subordination. A key feature of the established and outsider
relations relates to Elias’s earlier work on civilising processes, whereby “the established almost invariably
experience and present themselves as more ‘civilized’ and outsiders are constructed as more ‘barbaric’”
(van Krieken, 1998:p.151). Not only are outsiders constructed as uncivilised, unrestrained and
unrespectable, acceptance by the established requires them to adopt forms of behaviour, social norms and
values deﬁned as civilised and respectable by the established.
3.5 It is possible to apply Elias’ concept of established and outsider relations to sexuality, whereby
heterosexuality represents the established, civilised and respectable and diverse sexualities represent the
outside, uncivilised and unrespectable. Since the nineteenth century and the pioneers of sexology therehave been demands for the acceptance of homosexuality on the grounds of respectability and normality.
More recently, sexual politics has been predicated on the notion of lesbians and gay men as ‘virtually
normal’ (Sullivan, 1996) and there have been calls for the removal of “state barriers to participation”
(Phelan, 2000: p.432) in civil society by the extension of heteronormatively deﬁned and State sanctioned
rights to lesbians and gay men. Those outsiders whose sexual behaviour and relationships most closely
resemble that of the established are more likely to be acknowledged and recognised, even if they are not
actually accepted as members of the established group. Likewise, those outsiders whose sexual behaviour
and relationships continue to be constructed as uncivilised and unrestrained because they are non-
monogamous or ‘unsafe’ are pathologised and are less likely to be acknowledged or recognised.
3.6 We are reminded here of Queer critiques of the “politics of normalisation”, which result in new
ﬁgurational relations between the established and outsider groups and see the formation of the dichotomy
between good gay citizen and bad queer outlaw. It has been suggested by some queer theorists that the
cost of the move towards greater formal equality for lesbians and gay men has been a shrinking of the
sexual world and an attempt to “domesticate promiscuous queers” (Phelan, 2001 cited in Richardson,
2004: p.398. See also, Warner, 1999a, 1999b). Visibility and acceptance in the public sphere means
increased regulation and surveillance and requires the acceptance of liberal principles of toleration.
Therefore, public manifestations of homosexuality, or indeed, any diverse and non-conforming sexuality,
are tolerated as long as they do not pose too much of a threat to the heteronormativity of the public /
private divide. Richard Goldstein (2002: p.3) has characterised this conditionality of public visibility as “If
you’re gay, it’s okay; if you’re queer, disappear”. In other words, in Eliasian terms, acceptance by the
established group is conditional and the established / outsider ﬁgurations continue to be characterised by
dominance and subordination.
3.7 Changing ﬁgurational dynamics can also be identiﬁed between lesbians and gay men, as well as
between lesbians, gay men and bisexuals. During certain times throughout history, lesbians, gay men and
bisexuals can clearly be seen as occupying the same personal pronoun position of ‘I’ and ‘we’, despite
their different social positions or roles on the grounds of sexuality, gender, class, ethnicity and so on. For
example, the Gay Liberation Front, the radical movement of the early 1970s was not predicated on single-
issue, sexuality politics but, rather, was committed to an anti-capitalist agenda. It made connections
between oppression on the grounds of sexuality and other structural inequalities, such as sexism and
racism (Watney, 1980). In this sense, the ‘We’ of the GLF transcended social roles and the ‘They’
positions were occupied by those who stood outside the movement. However, there was considerable
fragmentation within the GLF especially along the lines of gender and class, which highlights different
ﬁgurational relationships. From the inception of the GLF, the position of women had been ambiguous. On
the one hand, conceptualising homosexual oppression within a framework of patriarchy, sexism and
restrictive sex / gender roles, would seem to suggest that feminism was conceptually and strategically
embedded within GLF ideology (Weeks, 1990). Indeed, there are a number of areas where there are
considerable similarities, notably in the strategy of politicising the personal and in the commitment to
challenging self-oppression and ‘false-consciousness’ (Watney, 1980). On the other hand, the culture and
membership of the GLF was overwhelmingly male. One woman who contributed to Alkarim Jivani’s
anthology of lesbian and gay life in the twentieth century and who had been involved in the Manchester
branch of the GLF states, “The lads from GLF were very contradictory… They were very loud in meetings,
they always wanted to chair the meetings. They were very butch, if you will, and we felt that they didn’t
have an understanding of our sexuality. They were reluctant to share jobs and to share power and so we
were ﬁghting a battle within a battle” (Luchia Fitzgerald in Jirvani, 1997: p.169). The failure on the part of
the men in the GLF to understand lesbians’ sexuality and, to a lesser extent, women’s failure to
understand theirs, reﬂects the fact that, whilst they were all committed to equality and to ending
homophobic oppression, that meant different things to gay men and lesbians (Weeks, 1990). Lesbians in
the GLF were as concerned with gender equality, including equal pay and issues around the family and
childcare, as they were with equality on the grounds of sexuality. From 1971 onwards, women started
withdrawing from the GLF, ﬁnding support in the Women’s Liberation Movement. Janet Dixon was one of
the women who felt there was no alternative but to leave the GLF. “We, the lesbians, began to abandon the
GLF dream… in terms of heterosexism, whatever your sexuality, if you are a woman you are always
second best. Gay men, under pressure, could return to the closet and regain all the privileges of being
male. Where could lesbians go?” (Dixon, 1988: p.75). In the quotes it is possible to see how both of these
women positioned gay men as the ‘they’ to the ‘We’ of lesbian sexuality. For Fitzgerald, it was the failure of
gay men to have an “understanding of our [lesbian] sexuality” that determined the ‘We’ and ‘They’
ﬁguration, whilst for Dixon, it was their position as men that represented the ‘They’ to the position of
‘Women’. It might be argued from an Eliasian perspective that despite the shared ‘I’ and ‘we’ positions on
the grounds of ideology and politics, the different social positions adopted by members of the GLF on the
grounds of gender and class contributed to its demise. Not only do these examples demonstrate the way in
which ﬁgurations are in a constant state of ﬂux, they also illustrate that “what constitutes a social group is
not internal to the attributes and self-understanding of its members. Rather what makes a group is the
relation in which it stands to others” (Young, 1997: p.389). Understood in this way, one’s identity cannot be
understood as an individualised, reﬂexive project of the self but, rather, as one element in a complex and
multi-perspectival story of interconnectedness and interdependency.
Challenging the Reﬂexive Turn in Lesbian and Gay Sociology
4.1 Analysing lesbian and gay identities through an Eliasian lens represents a challenge to the trend
towards reﬂexivity in sociology. In contemporary theories of and research on lesbian and gay reﬂexivity, it
is perhaps Anthony Giddens’ notion of the reﬂexive self that is most clearly identiﬁable especially his
thesis on choice biographies, life politics and the democratisation of relationships. Giddens (1991, 1992)
argued that under the conditions of high modernity, our identities are losing their rigidity and are becoming
increasingly ﬂuid. Identities can be chosen and changed in what he called a ‘reﬂexive project of the self’. A
central feature of the reﬂexive project of the self concerns the notion of choice narratives, the idea that “On
the level of the self, a fundamental component of day-to-day life activity is simply that of choice” (Giddens,1991: p.80, italics in original), whereby individuals create and re-create their lifestyles and identities from a
“plurality of choices” (ibid, p.82) as free thinking and free acting agents, freed from the “[structural]
shackles of the past” (ibid, p.211). This reﬂexive project of the self becomes translated in to a language of
politics as life politics, which replaces the earlier emancipatory politics. Where emancipatory politics was
concerned with “liberating individuals and groups from constraints which adversely affect their life chances”
(ibid, 210), life politics is a politics of lifestyle, inextricably linked to questions of self-identity. He also
argued that sexual relationships were undergoing a transformation, becoming increasingly democratised
and equalised. Giddens maintained that a democratisation of the personal sphere is difﬁcult in
heterosexual relationships, due to the fact that sexuality has traditionally been inextricably linked to
reproduction. In lesbian and gay relationships, however, “sexuality can be witnessed in its complete
separation from reproduction” (ibid, p.143) and there is greater degree of equalisation, which “is an intrinsic
element in the transformation of intimacy” (ibid, p. 149). Whilst Giddens’ notion of the reﬂexive self can be
found in a wide range of sociological texts on lesbian and gay life, in the British literature it is Jeffrey
Weeks (1995, 1998, 2007) and Ken Plummer (1995, 2001, 2003) who have most explicitly drawn on his
analysis in their work, especially in their conceptualisation of sexual and intimate citizenship[3].
4.2 Weeks identiﬁes three moments that have facilitated the emergence of the sexual citizen. Firstly, he
suggests that there has been a democratisation of relationships, characterised by detraditionalization,
egalitarianism and autonomy. In The Sexual Citizen (1998: p.44) Weeks explicitly correlates his notion of
egalitarianism with Giddens’ ‘transformation of intimacy’ and autonomy, or the “varied patterns of domestic
involvement, sexual intimacy and mutual responsibilities that are increasingly displacing traditional
patterns of marriage and the family” (ibid.p.44), with what Giddens has referred to as `experiments in living'
The second moment in the development of the sexual citizen identiﬁed by Weeks is the emergence of new
subjectivities. In other words, in keeping with Giddens’ ‘reﬂexive project of the self’ our identities, far from
being ﬁxed, are open to the ﬂuidity and change. Finally, Weeks suggests that new stories or new narratives
about the self and sexual identity have opened up new possibilities for knowing about the intimate sphere.
The ‘narratives’ he refers include ‘coming out’ stories, stories of discrimination and prejudice and stories
about living with HIV. Crucially, for the sexual citizen, these are stories “which spring up from everyday life,
but in turn place new demands on the wider community for the development of more responsive policies, in
economics, welfare, the law, culture” (Weeks, 1998: p.47). The Giddensian inﬂuence continues in Weeks’
most recent work as the following quote illustrates, “In the contemporary world, people are being forced t
remake themselves constantly, to see their lives as a project that must be constantly attended to” (Weeks,
2007: p.125).
4.3 In a similar way Ken Plummer’s notion of intimate citizenship echoes Giddens’ claims of
democratisation of relationships, choice narratives and life politics. Intimate citizenship is concerned with
“the control (or not) over one’s body, feelings, relationships: access (or not) to representations,
relationships, public spaces, etc: and socially grounded choices (or not) about gender identities” (Plummer,
1995: p.151). He sees intimate citizenship as “a sensitising concept, which sets about analysing a plurality
of public discourses and stories about how to live the personal life in a late modern world where we are
confronted by an escalating series of choices and difﬁculties around intimacies” (Plummer, 2001:p.238).
Central to Plummer’s notion of intimate citizenship is the telling of sexual stories, the making public of
what was previously private and intimate[4]. Plummer (1995) argues that there has been a proliferation of
sexual stories since the mid to late twentieth century, including the ‘coming out’ story, stories of the
‘family’, emotions, representations, gender, identity and the erotic (Plummer, 1995). Not only has there
been a proliferation in the number and nature of stories being told but, crucially, the political landscape has
changed from one where the focus is on a traditional politics of rights and justice to a politics of
empowerment, emancipation and democratisation (Giddens, 1991), what Plummer calls a “radical,
pluralistic, democratic contingent, participatory politics of human life choices and differences” (Plummer,
1995: p.147). In other words, there has been a move from emancipatory politics to life politics.
4.4 Whilst it is possible to read Weeks’ and Plummer’s characterisation of contemporary sexual identities
as an example of Giddens’ notion of reﬂexivity, or at the very least draw analogies between their work, and
both authors make explicit reference to him, I would argue that, read through an Eliasian lens, their claims
of self narrative and choice biographies in late modernity tell us as much, if not more, about collective
identities, shared experiences and interdependencies as they do about a reﬂexive project of the self.
Indeed, both authors identify collectivity and community as central in the formation of self-identity even
though, arguably there is a privileging of individual agency. For example, Plummer, coming from the
symbolic interactionist tradition, saw telling sexual stories as symbolic interactions, in so far as they are
narrated, given meaning and consumed through social interaction. However unique our life trajectories
appear to be, sexual stories can only be given meaning with reference to the wider social, political and
cultural contexts within which they are told. The symbolic importance of stories is not necessarily to be
found in the individual narratives that are told, nor in the minutiae of the stories themselves, but rather in
“the interactions which emerge around story telling” (Plummer, 1995: p.20) and, particularly, the interactions
or “joint” actions between the producers, coaxers and consumers of stories. Similarly, Weeks’ analysis of
the creation and recreation of lesbian and gay identities cannot be understood in isolation because, as
Heaphy (2008) suggests, “they are mediated through lesbian and gay community values”. Weeks (1996:
p.83) has suggested that the idea of a sexual community is a ﬁction, albeit a ﬁction that is necessary to
engender a sense of “an imagined community, an invented tradition which enables and empowers”.
Community acts, therefore, not only as a repository of shared values but also as a focus of individual and
collective identity. It provides a focus for the expression of identity, acting as a base for collective social
and political action and providing the context for the development of a shared ethos (Weeks, 1996). For
both Weeks and Plummer, it is only through awareness of and some degree of engagement with a
collectivity that self-identity is formed and re-formed. It is here, in the intersection and interconnectedness
of individual and collective identities that Norbert Elias’ sociology can prove illuminating. In contrast to
theories of reﬂexivity based on individualisation and choice narratives that dominate the sociology of
identity, Elias highlights the continued signiﬁcance of collectivity and interdependence. Reading the work of
Weeks and Plummer through an Eliasian lens does not just represent a semantic shift, using differentlinguistic tools to describe and analyse the same phenomenon. Elias’ process sociology does offer
something different to our understanding of contemporary lesbian and gay lives. It provides us with the
means to theorise the dynamic and ﬂuid relationships between disparate sexual identities, which, at times,
are characterised by similarity, belonging and interconnectedness and, at others, by difference, otherness
and separation. Speciﬁcally, an Eliasian perspective allows us to analyse changes in the ‘I-We’ relationship
without giving preference to only the ‘I’ or the ‘We’ identity.
4.5 What becomes evident in the work of both Plummer and Weeks is that, despite the fact that they draw
explicitly on Giddens’ notions of reﬂexivity, transformation of intimacy and life politics, their
characterisation of lesbian and gay life should be seen as neither excessively individualised nor as
presenting reﬂexivity as having “simplistic liberatory potential” (Adams, 2008: p.521). Both see individual
identity grounded in and (re)created by collective identity because it is through interaction, shared
experience and collectivity that individual identities are given meaning, mediated through sharing sexual
stories or membership of community. In this sense, although they do not use Elias’ terminology, we can
read their work through an Eliasian lens because in both authors’ work it is possible to see the relationship
between the formation of the ‘I’ identity and the ‘We’ identity. We can see the relationship between the
subjectively experienced, individual habitus and the collectively co-authored social habitus. We can see
the ways ﬁgurations, in constant ﬂux and dynamism, continue to shape one’s individual and collective
identity or, in Eliasian terms, our ‘I’ and ‘We’ image. Both authors allow for agency, particularly in the form
of telling sexual stories, asserting positive and proud sexual identities and coming together as a
community to resist and challenge compulsory heterosexuality. At the same time, there is an
acknowledgement that there are limits to this agency, that there are occasions when it is not possible to
tell one’s story or to have control over how the story is heard by an audience, that community is not a site
of resistance and collectivity for all because it creates new ﬁgurations of outsiders as well as insiders. The
agency that is present in their work is one that is one that reﬂects “an embedded, embodied and
contradictory reﬂexivity” (Adams, 2006: p.521) that is intimately and inextricably bounded to that of others.
4.6 In conclusion, let’s return to Heaphy’s article and his appeal for a reﬂexive sociology, which was
predicated on the argument that scholars need to engage in critical reﬂection in an attempt to present an
account of lesbian and gay lives that avoids universalising and homogenising tendencies. He claimed that
without employing reﬂexive methodology or reﬂexive sociology, it is impossible to accurately portray the
diverse and disparate experiences of lesbians and gay men. Throughout this article, it has been argued
that Elias’ process sociology and, especially, his ﬁgurational approach can go some way to addressing
difference. Individual identity / habitus has to be understood, not only in the context of the collective
habitus / identity but also as a temporal phenomenon formed over generations and linked as much to the
past as it is to the present. It is also important to recognise that identity and habitus are multi-layered and
multi-perspectival and are shaped by the relations or ﬁgurations we have with those around us. The
expression of a lesbian or gay identity does involve choice, creativity and narration but the ‘I’ identity does
not and cannot exist without reference to a wider set of identity positions. As Elias (1970: p.124) himself,
argued “there can be no ‘I’ without ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘we’, ‘you’ or ‘they’ [….] Taken together, the personal
pronouns are in fact an elementary expression of the fact that every person is fundamentally related to
other people, and that every human individual is fundamentally a social being”.
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Notes
1Although similar, Elias’ and Bourdieu’s conceptualisations of habitus do differ, with Elias drawing much
more heavily on Freudian theory and, therefore, presenting a more psychologically informed view of the
habitus. Elias and Bourdieu also applied the concept of habitus to different social phenomena in their
analyses (Reed-Danaby, 2005; Kasper, 2009). However, this does not point to fundamental differences in
their characterisation, but rather “differences in their emphases and interests” (Kasper, 2009: p.317).
2Habitus or ‘habit’ has a long tradition in sociology and can be found in the work of the founding fathers,
including Emile Durkheim and Max Weber (Camic, 1986). It was only during the mid-twentieth century that
habit was effectively “excised from the conceptual structure of the ﬁeld [of sociology]” (Camic, 1986:
p.1039), primarily by the structural functionalist sociologists of this period.
3This is not to suggest that Giddens is the main or only inﬂuence in their work, nor that their work did not
address issues of self-identity, creativity and story-telling prior to his conceptualisation of reﬂexive
biographies but rather that both Weeks and Plummer make an explicit references to Giddens reﬂexivity
thesis.
4See Reynolds (2010) for a critical discussion of intimate citizenship and, speciﬁcally his argument that, if
intimate citizenship is to be meaningful and realised, it is necessary to disentangle the intimate and the
private.
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